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Sammendrag 
Artikkelen viser at omsettbare utslippskvoter og en avgift på utslipp påvirker bedrifters teknologivalg 
ulikt under usikkerhet. Bedriftene velger den samfunnsøkonomisk optimale teknologien under 
kvotehandel, men ikke under en avgift. Modellering av endogent teknologivalg gir dermed et 
argument for omsettbare utslippskvoter sammenliknet med en avgift på utslipp.   
1 Introduction
Technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental
problems such as climate change, depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain. In
the longer run, the ability to spur technical innovations and implementation of
advanced abatement equipment may be the single most important factor when
evaluating public environmental policy.1 Therefore, it is not surprising that
the literature on R&D and ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in advanced abatement
technology is vast.2
However, as pointed out by Krysiak (2008), one aspect of this literature is
somewhat surprising: these studies tend to analyze how much is invested,3 but
do not consider the kind of technology that is implemented. This constitutes
a shortcoming of the literature. For example, emissions reductions of SOx and
NOx may be achieved either by installing scrubbers
4 or by relying on fuel sub-
stitution to, e.g., low-sulfur coal. Similarly, emissions of CO2 may be reduced
by, e.g., a switch from coal to gas or carbon capture and storage (CCS). How
this choice is aﬀected by the environmental policy regime is arguably an impor-
tant consideration in evaluation of public policy. Furthermore, ﬁrms’ technology
choice will aﬀect the demand for technology and, thereby, the direction of R&D
eﬀort (see, e.g., Griliches, 1957 or Ruttan, 2001).
1See, e.g., Kneese and Schultze (1975) or Orr (1976) for an early presentation of this view.
Jaﬀe and Stavins (1995) oﬀer an empirical approach.
2See Jaﬀe et al. (2002), Lo¨schel (2002), or Requate (2005) for reviews of the literature.
3See, e.g., Denicolo (1999) and Requate and Unold (2003).
4That is, e.g., post-combustion ﬂue-gas desulfurization and selective catalytic reduction,
respectively.
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This paper examines how environmental regulation aﬀects induced technol-
ogy choice, and how this inﬂuences the optimal choice between regulatory in-
struments. We consider two types of regulation: tradable emissions permits and
an emissions tax. These are presently by far the most important cases where
both price- and quantity-based regulatory approaches are suitable. We will not
consider how uncertainty concerning the relative slopes of the environmental
damage function and the ﬁrms’ abatement cost functions aﬀects the ranking of
price- and quantity-based regulation. That topic is analyzed by, e.g., Weitzman
(1974), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003).
Under tradable emissions permits, the government sets a cap on aggregate
emissions, and the issued licenses to emit (permits) are tradable among ﬁrms.
Prominent examples of such schemes are found in the EU emissions trading
scheme, the US SO2 trading program and various regulatory schemes for NOx
emissions in the US.5 Price-based approaches like harmonized prices, fees, or
taxes currently have no international experience (Nordhaus, 2007). However,
emissions taxes have considerable national experience. Two examples are the
US tax on ozone-depleting chemicals and the Norwegian CO2 tax.
We introduce two sources of uncertainty: demand-side uncertainty repre-
sented by random variables in the consumer utility function, and supply-side
5See EU (2003, 2005, 2009) or Convery and Redmond (2007) for more on the EU ETS.
Joskow et al. (1998) oﬀer a brief but informative account of the US SO2 trading program.
The NOx programs are the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), the Ozone
Transport Commission (OTC), NOx Budget Program, and the NOx State Implementation
Plan (SIP). For details, see Burtraw et al. (2005).
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uncertainty modeled as random elements in the ﬁrms’ abatement cost functions.
The model structure and these shocks are outlined in Section 3. In Sections 4
and 5 we demonstrate that either of the two regulatory instruments may in-
duce the most ﬂexible technology; i.e, the technology that best accommodates
the ﬁrms to respond to new information. Speciﬁcally, a tax encourages the
most ﬂexibility if and only if the stochastic element in abatement costs and the
equilibrium permit price have suﬃciently strong positive covariance, compared
with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced. Then, we show
in section 6 that endogenous technology choice provides a comparative advan-
tage in favor of tradable-quantity regulation compared with Weitzman (1974).
Intuitively, the ﬁrms’ technology investment decisions aﬀect the ﬂuctuations in
aggregate emissions under an emissions tax, and thereby the expected social cost
of emissions. This source of externality does not arise under tradable emissions
permits where aggregate emissions are ﬁxed.
This paper contributes to the literature by considering regulation, welfare,
technology choice and uncertainty in one model setup. Krysiak (2008) does
this in the case of production of a public good, but we show that the results in
Krysiak (2008) have limited relevance in the important case of pollution abate-
ment. The reason is that the product market for the good of which production
cause emissions inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ investment decisions. As the analysis in
Krysiak (2008) does not feature a product market, his results are only valid for
comparison of emissions trading and an emissions tax when the demand for the
good produced is constant (which would allow us to ignore the product mar-
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ket).6 In the present paper, we explicitly compare price- and quantity-based
instruments in the case of environmental pollution. Our results diﬀers from
those of Krysiak (2008) in several respects. Most importantly, Krysiak (2008)
ﬁnds that price-based regulation leads to implementation of a more ﬂexible tech-
nology. In contrast, we ﬁnd that either price- or quantity-based regulation may
induce the most ﬂexible technology.
2 Review of related literature
This paper relates to two important strands of the literature; i.e., that of price-
induced innovation and that of prices versus quantities. We present only a
brief overwiew here. Beginning with the literature on price-induced innovation,
Morton and Schwartz (1968) show that optimal technology choice depends on
the initial technology, the relative factor prices and the relative costs of acquiring
diﬀerent types of innovations. Magat (1978) introduces regulation and ﬁnds that
eﬄuent taxes and eﬄuent standards lead to a distinctively diﬀerent allocation
of R&D funds between improvements in abatement technology and production
technology. Kon (1983) looks at the role of output price uncertainty and shows
that it can lead to investment in more labor-intensive technologies. Mendelsohn
(1984) examines investment under price- and quantity-based regulation. He
ﬁnds that quantity-based instruments have an advantage, because price-based
regulation induce excessive variation in output. Mills (1984) shows that an
unregulated competitive ﬁrm will invest more in ﬂexibility if demand uncertainty
6Krysiak (2008) addresses this point on page 1282.
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increases. Lund (1994) allows R&D growth to take more than one direction, and
shows that this may create the need for interplay between R&D subsidies and a
carbon tax. Zhao (2003) ﬁnds that abatement cost uncertainties reduce ﬁrms’
investment incentive under both tradable emissions permits and emission taxes
if the investment is irreversible, and more so under taxes. Kaboski (2005) shows
that relative input price uncertainty can cause investment inaction as the ﬁrms
wait to get more information about what type of technology is most proﬁtable
to implement. Fowlie (2010) examines the US NOx Budget Program and ﬁnds
that deregulated plants were less likely to implement more capital intensive
environmental compliance options compared with regulated or publicly owned
plants.
The literature on implications of uncertainty on optimal choice of policy in-
struments (without technology investment) is extensive. In a seminal article,
Weitzman (1974) shows that a higher ratio of the slope of marginal damages
relative to the slope of marginal abatement costs favors quotas. Hoel and Karp
(2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003) extend this result to stock pollutants with
additive uncertainty.7 They also ﬁnd that an increase in the discount rate or
the stock decay rate favors tax usage, and obtain numerical results that suggest
that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gases. Hoel and Karp
(2001) examine the case with stock pollutants and multiplicative uncertainty.
Their analytical results are ambiguous, but, using a numerical model, they ﬁnd
7Additive and multiplicative uncertainty applies to the intercept and the slope of marginal
abatement costs, respectively.
8
that taxes dominate quotas for a wide range of parameter values under both
additive and multiplicative uncertainty in the case of climate change mitiga-
tion policies. Stavins (1996) shows that positive correlation between marginal
costs and marginal beneﬁts works in favor of quantity-based instruments with
ﬂow pollutants. Hybrid policies that combine price- and quantity-based poli-
cies have been examined by, e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976), Weitzman (1978),
Pizer (2002), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), and Krysiak and Oberauner (2010).
These studies suggest that hybrid policies generally dominate a single instru-
ment approach.
3 The modeling framework
Consider a sector featuring n risk-neutral ﬁrms that supply a homogeneous
good q. One unit of production causes one unit of emissions that is subject to
either an emissions tax or tradable emissions permits regulation. This could, for
example, be the power sector located in a country (or group of countries like the
EU) that mitigates carbon emissions in order to meet its Kyoto requirements,
or the electricity sector covered by the NOx Budget Program in the US. We
assume divisibility between the costs of abatement and other production costs.
This is reasonable in the case of end-of-pipe abatement technology like, e.g.,
carbon capture and storage.8 In order to focus on the abatement technology
8Without this assumption, we would have additional spillover eﬀects under both regulatory
approaches (featuring cross derivatives between the elements a and q in the cost function).
We argue in Section 7 that our main results do not depend qualitatively on the functional
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choice, we let the cost of producing the good (without abatement) be given by
q2i /2 for any ﬁrm i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Finally, perfect competition is assumed
in all markets.9
We extend the model of Weitzman (1974) by analyzing the long-run regu-
lation problem where any ﬁrm i ∈ N can choose the technology parameters α
and β in the following abatement cost function:
ci(qi, ai) =
1
2
q2i + (αi + ηi)ai +
βi
2
a2i . (1)
Here ai is ﬁrm i’s abatement and ηi ∼
(
0, σ2η
)
is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc stochastic vari-
able.10 The chosen set of technology parameters {αi, βi} incurs investment costs
k(αi, βi), with αi, βi > 0; k(αi, βi) ≥ 0; kα, kβ < 0; and kαα, kββ ≥ 0.11 These
assumptions imply that reducing the short-run costs always increases capital
costs, and that the marginal costs of reducing αi and βi increase for lower val-
ues of these technology parameters (i.e., more advanced technology). This is in
accordance with the standard assumption of decreasing marginal productivity
of capital. Because a lower value on βi reduces the slope on the marginal abate-
ment cost function, it may be interpreted as a higher level of ﬂexibility.12 That
is, if a ﬁrm reduces βi, it increases its ability to respond to new information.
form of the cost function.
9Results by Joskow et al. (1998) and Convery and Redmond (2007) indicate, respectively,
that the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions and the EU emissions trading scheme are
competitive.
10As usual, ηi ∼
(
0, σ2η
)
means that ηi is randomly distributed with expected value 0 and
variance σ2η .
11This speciﬁcation is equal to the production technology speciﬁcation in Krysiak (2008) if
we omit the term q2i /2.
12Stigler (1939) and Marschak and Nelson (1962) early referred to the ﬁrms’ ability to
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For example, abatement of NOx from electricity production is possible through,
e.g., installation of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), which incur high cap-
ital costs and can reduce emissions by up to 90 percent, or Selective Non-
Catalytic reduction (SNCR), which have lower investments costs but only reduce
emissions rates with up to 35 percent. In terms of our stylized functional form,
SCR technology will be characterized by a lower value on βi than that of the
SNCR technology. Similarly, emissions reduction of CO2 is possible by use of,
e.g., CCS or by fuel substitution. While CCS is capital intensive and allows for
large emissions reductions with relatively small increases in marginal abatement
costs (low βi), fuel substitution is less capital intensive but cannot achieve high
emissions reductions without increasing marginal costs substantially (high βi).
We add ηi ∼
(
0, σ2η
)
to ﬁrm i’s abatement costs. For example, this reﬂects
ﬂuctuations in factor prices or factor productivity, or a breakdown of abate-
ment equipment. As argued by Weitzman (1974), the determination of ηi could
involve elements of genuine randomness, but might also stem from lack of in-
formation. The abatement cost shock ηi enters our functional form linearly,
which is similar to, e.g., Weitzman (1974), Hoel and Karp (2002), and Karp
and Zhang (2006). Note that all ﬁrms share the same uncertainty and menu
of possible abatement cost structures. Therefore, they choose equal abatement
technologies (because they are identical in period 2). We henceforth suppress
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc subscript i except where necessary (i.e., on variables that diﬀer
change production levels in response to new information as their “ﬂexibility”. Mills (1984)
and Krysiak (2008) carry on this terminology.
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across ﬁrms) to streamline notation.
Let the utility of consumption of q be given by the strictly concave function:
u(qj) = bqj − d
2
q2j + εjqj − pqj , (2)
for consumer j ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, with b, d > 0, εj ∼
(
0, σ2ε
)
and p being
the product price on q. We may interpret the stochastic element εj as random
variation in preferences, or in the supply of other goods that are compliments
or substitutes to q. Alternatively, εj may model private information consumer
j has on its own preferences; i.e. only the distribution εj ∼
(
0, σ2ε
)
is common
knowledge until εj is revealed in period 3. We assume that the demand-side
shocks εj and the abatement cost shocks ηi are independently distributed ran-
dom variables, i.e., the expected value E(εjηi) = 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M ,
and that εj and ηi are symmetrically correlated across consumers and ﬁrms,
respectively. We state the following lemma on the properties of the correlation
coeﬃcients:
Lemma 1 Let the correlation coeﬃcients be given by ρη = E (ηiηi′) /σ
2
η for
all ﬁrms i, i′ ∈ N (i = i′) and ρε = E (εjεj′) /σ2ε for all consumers j, j′ ∈ M
(j = j′). Then we have ρη ∈ [−1/ (n− 1) , 1] and ρε ∈ [−1/ (m− 1) , 1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note in particular that the lower bounds on the correlation coeﬃcients ρη
and ρε become arbitrarily close to zero as the number of ﬁrms n or consumers
m increases, respectively.13
13Our assumption that ρη = E (ηiηi′ ) /σ
2
η is similar to Krysiak (2008), who assumes ρη ∈
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The model is organized in three periods. First, in period 1, the regulator
sets the emissions tax or a binding cap on aggregate emissions. The ﬁrms react
to the regulation and invest in abatement technology in period 2. Finally, the
ﬁrms choose their abatement and production levels in period 3. We assume
that the outcomes of the stochastic variables are determined between periods 2
and 3. That is, decisions in periods 1 and 2 are made under uncertainty, while
ﬁrms have full information in period 3. The ﬁrms’ production and abatement
decisions in period 3 are made contingent on the ﬁrms’ abatement technology
decisions in period 2. So, the ﬁrms’ investment decisions are formulated as a
two-stage game: the payoﬀs in period 3 determine the technology investment
decisions in period 2. The model is solved by backwards induction and our
equilibrium concept is that of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
4 Consumption, production and abatement
Let σ refer to the permit price and τ denote the emissions tax. The proﬁt
function in period 3 of any ﬁrm i ∈ N is given by:
πi = max
qi,ai
[
pqi − 1
2
q2i − (α+ ηi)ai −
β
2
a2i − w (qi − ai)
]
, (3)
where w ∈ {σ, τ}, qi > 0, ai ∈ (0, qi]. Both the permit price σ and the emissions
tax τ remain to be determined. Because technology may diﬀer across the regu-
latory regimes, we have α ∈ {ασ, ατ} and β ∈ {βσ, βτ}.14 We get the following
[0, 1].
14As a notational convention, “x” may refer to variable/parameter x under either regulatory
regime. If confusion is possible, we use “xσ” and “xτ” to refer to x under tradable emissions
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ﬁrst-order conditions for any ﬁrm i ∈ N :
qi = q = p− w, (4)
ai =
1
β
(w − α− ηi) , (5)
under the assumptions of interior solutions for production qi and abatement
ai. Equation (4) implies that the industry supply function is given by n(p−w).
We also observe that the second-order conditions to the maximization problem
(3) are fulﬁlled. Note that each ﬁrm’s production and abatement levels are
random variables before the outcomes of the stochastic events are known (i.e.,
in periods 1 and 2).
The consumers maximize utility as given by equation (2). The ﬁrst order
condition for any consumer j ∈ M is:
qj =
1
d
(b+ εj − p) . (6)
Hence, the market demand is given by 1d
∑
j∈M (b+ εj − p). Because aggre-
gate supply must equal aggregate demand,15 the product market equilibrium
condition is given by:
n (p− w) = 1
d
∑
j∈M
(b+ εj − p) . (7)
This equation implicitly yields the equilibrium product price p. Under tradable
quantity regulation, the regulator sets a binding cap on aggregate emissions
denoted Sσ. The emissions trading market-clearing condition then becomes
permits and an emissions tax, respectively.
15Open economy considerations are brieﬂy discussed in Section 7.
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(remember that one unit of production causes one unit of emissions):
Sσ = nqσ −
∑
i∈N
aiσ, (8)
where qσ and aiσ refer to the optimal levels of production and abatement un-
der tradable emissions permits, respectively. Equation (8) implicitly yields the
equilibrium permit price σ.
Under price-based regulation, the regulator sets an emissions tax τ . In
order to simplify comparison of the regulatory regimes, we let τ be determined
implicitly as the tax that realizes the expected emissions level Sτ .
16 Hence, the
emissions tax solves:
Sτ = E
(
nqτ −
∑
i∈N
aiτ
)
. (9)
Because the expectations operator is present in equation (9), but not in
equation (8), the two regulatory instruments diﬀer with respect to the risk
imposed upon the regulated ﬁrms. In particular, regulation ensures that actual
aggregate emissions (Z) are equal to the emissions target S under tradable-
quantity regulation, while Z is endogenous under price-based regulation.
Solving the systems of equations (4), (5), (7) and (8) under tradable quan-
tity regulation, and (4), (5), (7) and (9) under price-based regulation, we get
the regulatory regime contingent reduced form solutions to the endogenous vari-
ables in period 3. These are given in Table 2 in the appendix. The ﬁrst- and
second-order moments in the probability distributions of selected variables are
summarized in Table 1.
16It does not aﬀect our results whether the regulator chooses τ directly or via Sτ in equation
(9), because the regulator correctly foresee the ﬁrm’s actions.
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Table 1: Expectations and variances of endogenous variables in period 3
Tradable emissions permits Emissions tax
E(q) = V3σ
(
b+ Sσn βσ − ασ
)
V3τ
(
b+ Sτn βτ − ατ
)
E(a) = V3σ
(
b− ασ −
(
1
n +
d
m
)
Sσ
)
V3τ
(
b− ατ −
(
1
n +
d
m
)
Sτ
)
E(Z) = Sσ Sτ
V ar(q) = V 23σ
(
Vησ
2
η + Vεσ
2
ε
)
V 22τVεσ
2
ε
V ar(a) = 1
β2σ
(V1σ (V1σ − 2)Vη + 1)σ2η + V 23σVεσ2ε 1β2τ σ
2
η
V ar(Z) = 0 n
β2τ
Vησ
2
η + nV
2
2τVεσ
2
ε
V1 =
m+dn
m+mβ+dn
, V2 =
m
m+dn
and V3 =
m
m+mβ+dn
.
Vη =
1
n
(
1 + (n− 1)ρη
)
and Vε =
1
m
(1 + (m− 1)ρε).
V1, V2, V3, V1 (V1 − 2) ∈ (0, 1) and Vη , Vε ∈ [0, 1].
We observe from Tables 1 and 2 that the ﬁrm’s production level is indepen-
dent of the stochastic element to abatement costs ηi under an emissions tax.
This reﬂects that the marginal cost of emissions is constant and equal to the
tax in equilibrium. Together with our assumption of separability between abate-
ment costs and other production costs, this leaves the total costs of production
independent of the abatement cost shock ηi under an emissions tax. Under
tradable quantity regulation, in contrast, the production of any ﬁrm i ∈ N de-
creases in the stochastic shocks to the abatement cost ηi of all the i = 1, 2, . . . , n
ﬁrms. This occurs because the total cost of production depends on the permit
price, which is strictly increasing in abatement costs. We also observe that
the stochastic elements in the consumer’s utility functions εj aﬀect the optimal
production level stronger under an emissions tax than under tradable emissions
16
permits. The reason is that the cap on aggregate emissions forces the ﬁrms to
increase the aggregate abatement level when production increases due to the
demand side shock
∑
j∈M εj > 0. The associated increase in the permit price
increases total production costs, and thereby dampens the ﬁrms’ response to
∑
j∈M εj > 0. This mechanism is absent under price-based regulation, because
the emissions tax is constant.
Proceeding to abatement, optimal abatement levels are independent of the
demand-side shocks εj under price-based regulation. This occurs because the
ﬁrms simply abate until marginal abatement costs are equal to the emissions
tax, leaving aggregate emissions endogenous. Under tradable emissions permits
∑
j∈M εj > 0 increases abatement, because ﬂuctuations in aggregate emissions
(caused by ﬂuctuations in production) must be mirrored by aggregate abatement
in order to satisfy the emissions cap. We last note that the stochastic element to
abatement cost ηi aﬀects optimal abatement levels stronger under an emissions
tax than under tradable emissions permits. The reason is that Cov(σ, ηi) =
V1
n
(
1 + (n− 1)ρη
)
σ2η > 0, given ρη ∈ (−1/(n− 1), 1] (cf. Table 2). So a high
(low) equilibrium permit price tends to occur together with high (low) realized
abatement costs. This reduces the ﬁrms’ responses to the abatement costs
shocks. Again, this mechanism is absent under price-based regulation, because
the emissions tax is constant.
Finally, expected aggregate emissions are equal across the two regulatory
regimes if Sσ = Sτ , cf. Table 1. Equal expected production and abatement
levels across the regimes requires both Sσ = Sτ and equal technology, however.
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The reason is that the regulator has only one instrument available for each regu-
latory regime (i.e., the emissions cap S or the tax τ), while the ﬁrms have three
decision variables. That is, if the regulatory instruments are used to impose
equal expected aggregate emissions across the regimes, the regulator cannot en-
sure equal expected production levels. Therefore, although tradable emissions
permits and an emissions tax may be equivalent with respect to expected ag-
gregate emissions, the regulatory regimes will in general have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the product market when the abatement cost structure is endogenous. Note
that the regulator could alternatively calibrate its instruments in order to induce
equal expected aggregate production instead of emissions across the regulatory
regimes.
The following lemma formalizes important parts of the above discussion:
Lemma 2 Assume Sσ = Sτ and let the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem be
given by equation (3). Then we have the following:
(i) E(qσ) = E(qτ ) if ασ = ατ and βσ = βτ .
(ii) V ar(qσ) ≥ (≤)V ar(qτ ) ⇔ σ
2
η
σ2ε
≥ (≤)
(
1
V 21σ
− 1
)
Vε
Vη
.
(iii) V ar(aσ) ≥ (≤)V ar(aτ ) ⇔ σ
2
ε
σ2η
≥ (≤)
1
β2σ
[V2σVη+1]+
1
β2τ
V1σVε
.
Proof. The Lemma is obtained from Table 1.
Remember that the V ’s are constants deﬁned in Table 1. Part (i) in Lemma 2
implies that E(aσ) = E(aτ ) if Sσ = Sτ and the ﬁrms choose identical technology
under tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax.
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5 The ﬁrms’ investment decisions
The impetus of our analysis of the ﬁrms’ investment decisions in period 2 is
that their abatement technology choice depends on the expected abatement
levels and the extent of anticipated future ﬂuctuations in abatement. For a
given expected abatement level, intuition suggests that the ﬁrms are willing
to pay higher investment costs in order to increase ﬂexibility (reduce β) if the
variance in the abatement level is large. For example, if the equilibrium permit
price turns out to be unexpectedly high in period 3, a ﬁrm may reduce its costs
with a higher level of abatement. The ﬁrm can increase its adaptability to such
future events by investing in a more ﬂexible technology in period 2.
In period 2, any ﬁrm i ∈ N maximizes expected proﬁts with respect to
abatement cost structure as determined by α and β:
Π = max
α,β
E [π − k (α, β)] , (10)
with π given by equation (3). The interior solution to the maximization problem
(10) is characterized by the following ﬁrst-order conditions (see the appendix):
−kα = E (a) , (11)
−kβ = 1
2
(
V ar (a) + (E (a))
2
)
, (12)
with expectations E(a) and variances V ar(a) as given by Table 1 for each reg-
ulatory regime. Not surprisingly, a large expected abatement level increases
capital costs and decreases both α and β. Moreover, we show in the proof of
Proposition 1 below that a larger variance increases ﬂexibility (reduce β), as
conjectured above.
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In the introduction to this paper, we outlined the following research question:
how does environmental regulation inﬂuence ﬁrms’ technology choices through
the disparate risk environments that is imposed upon the ﬁrms? The following
proposition compares the induced technology choices under the benchmark cri-
terion of equal expected aggregate emissions across the two regulatory regimes:
Proposition 1 Let the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problems be given by equation
(10) and assume Sσ = Sτ . Then we have βσ ≤ (≥)βτ if and only if V ar(aσ) ≥
(≤)V ar(aτ ). In addition, if Παβ ≤ 0, βσ ≤ (≥)βτ implies ασ ≤ (≥)ατ . If
Παβ ≥ 0, βσ ≤ (≥)βτ implies ασ ≥ (≤)ατ .
Proof. See the appendix.
Remember that the condition for V ar(aσ) ≥ (≤)V ar(aτ ) is given in Lemma
2. Strict inequalities in the condition on the variances yield strict inequalities
between technology parameters α and β across the two regulatory regimes.
Proposition 1 has two important consequences. First, the two regulatory
instruments typically induce implementation of diﬀerent technologies. The un-
equal choices of technology when Sσ = Sτ follow from the diﬀerent economic
environments with regard to risk caused by the two regulatory regimes (the
regimes are equal when ση = σε = 0). This implication corroborates a point
emphasized by Krysiak (2008): the choice of environmental policy instrument
can have a lock-in eﬀect. That is, a switch between price- and quantity-based
regulations could render existing technology suboptimal and, therefore, devalue
the installed equipment and the acquired technological knowledge. If the re-
sultant loss of sunk technology investment costs is substantial, it may deter a
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change of regulatory instrument once it has been implemented.
Second, Proposition 2 states that both types of regulation may induce stronger
incentives to choose the most ﬂexible technology (lower β). This result diﬀers
from Krysiak (2008), who ﬁnds that price-based regulation always leads to im-
plementation of a more ﬂexible technology. The explanation for this diﬀerence is
that stochastic demand for the good (of which production causes emissions) in-
creases the variance in abatement under tradable emissions permits, and, hence,
the incentives to invest in ﬂexibility. This contrasts with an emissions tax, where
the optimal abatement level is independent of the product price. Because the
model in Krysiak (2008) does not feature a product market, this eﬀect does not
occur in his model.
We last observe that the regimes yield the same technology in the particular
case of a continuum of ﬁrms and independent stochastic variables when Sσ = Sτ .
This is true because the probability P (|σ − τ | > 
) → 0 as n → ∞ when ρη =
ρε = 0 for some (inﬁnitely) small constant 
; i.e. the probability distribution of
the market clearing permit price collapses around its expected value (by the law
of large numbers), which becomes equal to the emissions tax. So, Proposition 1
implies that the characteristics of tradable emissions permits converge toward
those of price-based regulation as the number of ﬁrms increases when the random
variables are independently distributed.
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6 Prices versus quantities with endogenous tech-
nology choice
Weitzman (1974) shows that a higher ratio of the slope of marginal damages
relative to the slope of marginal abatement costs favors quotas. In this paper,
we have shown that price- and quantity-based regulation inﬂuences the long-run
technology choice of ﬁrms in diﬀerent ways. How then is the ranking of price-
versus quantity-based instruments provided in Weitzman (1974) aﬀected by this
technology choice eﬀect?
Because our focus of interest is endogenous technology choice, we isolate the
regulation-dependent eﬀects on social welfare imposed by the ﬁrms’ choice of
technology. We characterize the technology chosen by a benevolent social plan-
ner, given that ﬁrms implement the proﬁt maximizing production and abate-
ment levels given in Table 2. In terms of our model, the ﬁrms’ decisions in
period 3 remain unaltered, but we let the social planner choose the technology
that maximizes social welfare in period 2. We then compare the social plan-
ners’ choice with the ﬁrms’ technology choice derived in Section 5. We will not
consider how uncertainty concerning the relative slopes of the environmental
damage function and the ﬁrms’ abatement cost functions aﬀects the ranking of
price- and quantity-based regulation.17
We ﬁrst observe that optimal policy tends to involve diﬀerent expected ag-
17That topic is analyzed by, e.g., Weitzman (1974), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002) and Newell
and Pizer (2003).
22
gregate emission levels under tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax.
The reason is that the regimes generally induce diﬀerent technologies and, hence,
diﬀerent marginal abatement costs (cf. Proposition 1). Moreover, as in, e.g.,
Weitzman (1974), the regulator cannot implement an optimal policy that en-
sures the aggregate marginal abatement cost to equal marginal environmental
damage, because the demand side shocks εj and the abatement cost shocks ηi
are stochastic and unknown to the regulator. Therefore, the regulator can only
achieve a second-best outcome.
Let G(Z) depict the social cost of aggregate emissions Z, with GZ > 0 and
GZZ ≥ 0. Expected social welfare can be calculated as:
W = max
α,β
E
⎡
⎣∑
j∈M
(
bqj − d
2
q2j + εjqj
)
−
∑
i∈N
(ci(qi, ai) + k (α, β))−G(Z)
⎤
⎦ ,
(13)
where ci(·) is given by equation (1). Moreover, qi = qj and ai denote the equi-
librium levels of production and abatement under tradable emissions permits or
an emissions tax, as given by Table 2.
We now characterize the technology that is socially optimal, given the ex-
pected aggregate emissions levels and the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing output and
abatement decisions under the two regulatory approaches. Under tradable emis-
sion permits, realized aggregate emissions Z are equal to the binding emissions
cap S. Hence, the social cost of emissions is a constant given by G(S). Maxi-
mization of W with respect to the technology parameters α and β then yields
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the following ﬁrst order conditions (see the appendix):
−kα = E(a), (14)
−kβ = 1
2
(
V ar(a) + (E(a))
2
)
. (15)
This is identical to the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms’ technology choice under tradable
emissions permits (cf. equations 11 and 12). It follows that ﬁrms will implement
the socially optimal technology under tradable emissions permits.
Under tax-based regulation, the level of aggregate emissions is endogenous
and the social cost of emissions is given by G(Z) with Z = S + 1β
∑
i∈N ηi +
V2
∑
j∈M εj (cf. Table 2). Maximization of W with respect to the technology
parameters α and β then yields the following ﬁrst order conditions (see the
appendix):
−kα = E(a), (16)
−kβ = 1
2
(
V ar(a) + (E(a))
2
)
− 1
nβ2
Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N
ηi
)
. (17)
These conditions diﬀer from the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms’ choice under tradable
emissions permits given by equations (11) and (12).
We observe that the covariance on the right-hand side of equation (17) is
zero when G(Z) is linear in aggregate emissions, because GZ is then a constant.
In this particular case the technology implemented by the ﬁrms coincides with
that of the social planner. Conversely, Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
> 0 if the social
cost of emissions is a strictly convex function. The reason is that GZ obtains
high values induced by high aggregate emissions when
∑
i∈N ηi is large. This
yields a positive covariance on the right-hand side of equation (17). Therefore,
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the social planner will choose a less ﬂexible technology (higher β) than the
technology chosen by the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms.
The second main research question outlined in the introduction asked how
the technology choice eﬀect matters for the choice between regulatory instru-
ments. We state the following result:
Proposition 2 Let social welfare be given by equation (13) and Table 2 give the
ﬁrms’ actions. Then, the ﬁrms’ technology choices are socially optimal under
tradable emissions permits. Under an emissions tax, the ﬁrms choose a too
ﬂexible and, hence, socially suboptimal technology, unless Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
=
0 (e.g., if social damage from emissions is linear).18
Proof. The proposition follows from equations (11), (12) and (14) to (17).
Proposition 2 implies that endogenous technology choice provides a com-
parative advantage in favor of tradable-quantity regulation as compared with
Weitzman (1974). What is the economic intuition underlying this result? In
contrast with tradable emissions permits, aggregate emissions may diﬀer from
its expected value under an emissions tax. This will increase the expected social
cost of emissions if the damage function is strictly convex, which is a well-known
result. The novel aspect here is that the ﬁrms can inﬂuence the size of this diﬀer-
ence by their choice of technology. We see this from the variance in aggregate
emissions under an emissions tax, which is given by n
β2
Vησ
2
η + nV
2
2 Vεσ
2
ε (cf.
Table 1). This expression obviously decreases in the technology parameter β,
18There are some other examples with Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
= 0 in equation (17), e.g., when
G(Z) is quadratic and ρη = −1/(n− 1).
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given ρη > −1/(n − 1). Therefore, if the social planner could choose the tech-
nology, they would reduce the ﬂuctuations of aggregate emissions around its
expected value by investing in a less ﬂexible technology. This decreases the
expected social cost of emissions. In contrast, the ﬁrms face a given price per
unit of emissions under an emissions tax and, consequently, have no incentive
to internalize the convexity of environmental damage cost in their technology
investment decisions. Therefore, the ﬁrms implement a too ﬂexible abatement
cost structure under the emissions tax. Intuitively, the social planner would, if
given the opportunity, choose a less ﬂexible technology in period 2 in order to
limit the ﬁrms’ ability to deviate from the expected aggregate emissions levels
in period 3. Importantly, this externality source does not arise under tradable
emissions permits, because aggregate emissions are ﬁxed.
Proposition 1 states that either an emissions tax or tradable emissions per-
mits could induce the most ﬂexible technology. Proposition 2 entails that en-
dogenous technology choice provides a bias in favor of tradable-quantity regula-
tion as compared with Weitzman (1974), because an emissions tax induces a too
ﬂexible and, hence, socially suboptimal technology. These two propositions do
not contradict each other. The reason is that the social planner would choose
the socially optimal technology, given the ﬁrms’ behavior as induced by the reg-
ulatory regime. Therefore, it is feasible that the ﬁrms choose the most inﬂex-
ible technology under an emissions tax, and that this is still too ﬂexible when
compared with the socially optimal technology under price-based regulation.
We also observe that the variance in realized emissions under an emissions tax
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converge towards zero as n → ∞ if ρη = ρε = 0. Hence, Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
ap-
proaches zero and price-based regulation yields the socially optimal technology
choice. This is consistent with our previous observation that the characteristics
of tradable emissions permits converge toward those of price-based regulation
as the number of ﬁrms increases when the random variables are independently
distributed.
How important is the technology choice eﬀects given in Propositions 2 and 3?
If we compare the ﬁrms’ technology choice under an emissions tax (cf. equations
11, 12) with the socially optimal technology (cf. equations 14 to 17), we see that
the comparative advantage of emissions trading increases in Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
when t ≤ 0. Because this covariance can be expressed as E (GZ∑i∈N ηi),
and GZ increases in aggregate emissions Z = S +
1
β
∑
i∈N ηi + V2
∑
j∈M εj ,
Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
must be an increasing function of E
((∑
i∈N ηi
)2)
= n(1+
(n−1)ρη)ση, given that G(Z) is strictly convex.19. Thus, the diﬀerence between
the ﬁrms’ technology choice and the socially optimal technology increases in σ2η
and ρη; i.e., in the variance and correlation of the shocks that aﬀect the ﬁrms’
realized abatement costs (ηi). The reason is that higher values of σ
2
η and ρη
cause ﬂexibility to induce a larger variation in aggregate emissions under price-
based regulation, and, thereby, a larger social cost of a too ﬂexible technology.
Therefore, the bias in favor of tradable-quantity regulation implied by Proposi-
tion 2 increases with the level of abatement cost uncertainty and the correlation
19A particularly simple example is G = γ
2
Z2, which yields Cov
(
GZ ,
∑
i∈N ηi
)
=
nγ
β
(
1 + (n− 1)ρη
)
σ2η
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across ﬁrms’ abatement costs.
It follows that we could expect tradable emissions permits to have a stronger
comparative advantage if large shocks that originate from the same sources and
aﬀect many ﬁrms similarly inﬂuence the ﬁrms’ abatement costs.20 If such in-
cidents play an important role in the overall risk the regulated ﬁrms face, a
very ﬂexible abatement technology, together with an emissions tax, could pos-
sibly greatly increase the variance in total emissions and, thereby, substantially
increase social damage. It is also important to note that the comparative ad-
vantage of tradable-quantity regulation increases in the convexity of the social
costs of aggregate emissions. This convexity varies across pollutants. For ex-
ample, the NOx Budget Program controlling smog-causing pollution in the US
may face quite strongly convex damage costs,21 while regulation that mitigates
greenhouse gas emissions from a limited number of countries may operate with
an approximately linear environmental damage function.
20For example, Parsons et al. (2009) states that a disruption in delivery of low-sulfur
coal because of track failures in October 2005 created a bottleneck that reduced deliveries
signiﬁcantly. In addition, a pair of coalmines had extended outages. The price of low-sulfur
coal trading in the Midwest peaked in December 2005 at a level triple the price a year earlier.
The shortage in low-sulfur coal forced 11 power companies to shift to higher-sulfur coal with
corresponding higher SO2 emissions.
21See, e.g., Mauzerall et al. (2005).
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7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that environmental regulation has a risk-related tech-
nology choice eﬀect. That is, the choice of policy instrument aﬀects which type
of technology to be implemented. We show that the ﬁrms’ technology choices are
socially optimal under tradable emissions permits, but not under an emissions
tax. The reason is that the ﬁrms’ technology investment decisions aﬀect vari-
ation in aggregate emissions under an emissions tax, and thereby the expected
social cost of emissions. This source of externality does not arise under tradable
emissions permits, where aggregate emissions are ﬁxed. Therefore, we conclude
that endogenous technology choice provides a comparative advantage in favor
of tradable-quantity regulation as compared with the well-known criterion in
Weitzman (1974).
This paper contributes to the literature by considering regulation, welfare,
technology choice and uncertainty in one model setup. Krysiak (2008) does the
same in the case of production of a public good. He ﬁnds that price-based reg-
ulation leads to implementation of the most ﬂexible technology, and that this is
socially suboptimal. In contrast, we ﬁnd that price-based regulation may induce
the least ﬂexible technology. This occurs if the variance in consumer demand
is suﬃciently strong compared with the covariance between the stochastic ele-
ment in abatement costs and the permit price. The reason for this diﬀerence is
that the product market inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ investment decisions in the case
of pollution abatement, and the analysis in Krysiak (2008) does not feature a
product market.
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Our representation of technology is very stylized and adopted to get tractable
analytical results. This does not aﬀect the qualitative results in Section 5, be-
cause ambiguity under our restrictive functional forms implies ambiguity in the
general case too. Regarding the welfare analysis in Section 6, our main results
are arguably likely to be robust against changes in the model setup: ﬁrstly, the
technology choice eﬀect is likely to be more pronounced if the ﬁrms could inﬂu-
ence its technology conﬁguration even more. Secondly, the source for ineﬃcient
technology choice under an emissions tax, caused by the covariance between
the stochastic elements to ﬁrms’ abatement costs and marginal environmental
damage, cannot arise under tradable emissions permits, because the cap on ag-
gregate emissions is given. On the other hand, the theoretical model does not
feature possibly important elements like, e.g., market power, R&D externali-
ties, distortionary taxes or non-uniform pollutants, which are likely to cause
ineﬃcient technology investment under tradable emissions permits.22 Further,
the model is static and does not feature dynamic aspects like, e.g., gradual dis-
closure of information, consumer savings or accumulation of stock pollutants.
Moreover, we assumed an exogenous number of ﬁrms, altough Spulber (1985)
shows that the exit and entry of ﬁrms inﬂuence the ranking of regulatory instru-
ments. Further, Mills (1984) demonstrates that competitive equilibrium with
free entry and exit may sustain a higher number of ﬁrms if demand ﬂuctuates
than if demand is stationary at its expected value. Finally, we have only consid-
22A previous version of the paper shows that the ﬁrms’ technology choice is socally subop-
timal under both price- and quantity-based regulation if there is a distortionary tax in the
product market (and that the ranking become ambiguous).
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ered a closed economy, but it can be shown that our qualitative results remain
valid if the ﬁrms in the regulated area sell the produced good in a world market
with an exogenous stochastic product price.23
Most importantly, this paper indicates that it is insuﬃcient to consider only
static properties and induced investment levels when evaluating a potential reg-
ulatory instrument; it is also important to assess the characteristics of the in-
duced technology. In particular, the possible comparative advantage of tradable
emissions permits over an emissions tax, induced by a higher ratio of the slope
of marginal damages relative to the slope of marginal abatement costs, tends to
be even stronger than shown by Weitzman (1974).
23However, if the social planner can aﬀect the world market product price (in the deriva-
tion of the socially optimal technology), it is reasonable to conjecture that they will invest
more (less) in technology than the competitive ﬁrms if the regulated area is a net importer
(exporter), in order to decrease (increase) the product price.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We ﬁrst prove that ρη ∈ [−1/(n− 1), 1]. A matrix is
a valid covariance matrix if and only if it is positive semi-deﬁnite. With n′
identical ﬁrms and ρη = E (ηiηi′) /σ
2
η the covariance matrix is given by the
following n′ × n′ matrix:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 ρη · · · ρη
ρη 1 · · · ρη
...
...
. . .
...
ρη ρη · · · 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
The determinant of this matrix is given by
(
1− ρη
)n′−1 (
1 + ρη (n
′ − 1)). It can
then be shown that the principal minors of our n×n covariance matrix satisfy the
criteria necessary for positive semi-deﬁniteness if and only if ρη ∈ [−1/(n− 1), 1]
(use the determinant criteria for positive semi-deﬁniteness with the given for-
mula for n′ = 1, n′ = 2, ..., n′ = n). The proof that ρε ∈ [−1/(m− 1), 1] is
similar.
Derivation of equations (11) and (12): Firm i’s ﬁrst order condition
wrt. α is:
dΠi
dα
= E
[
(p− w − qi) dqi
dα
+ (w − α− ηi − βai)
dai
dα
− kα − ai
]
= 0
⇔ −kα = E (ai) ,
while its ﬁrst order condition wrt. β is:
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dΠi
dβ
= E
[
(p− w − qi) dqi
dα
+ (w − α− ηi − βai)
dai
dα
− kβ − 1
2
a2i
]
= 0
⇔ −kβ = 1
2
E
(
a2i
)
=
1
2
(
var (a) + (E (a))
2
)
.
We used the ﬁrst order conditions (4) and (5) (the envelope theorem) in the
derivations.
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst derive the second order conditions to
the maximization problem (10). The Hessian is given by:
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ Παα Παβ
Παβ Πββ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ −kαα −
dE(a)
dα −kαβ − dE(a)dβ
−kαβ − 12 dE(a
2)
dα −kββ − 12 dE(a
2)
dβ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
where 12
dE(a2)
dα =
dE(a)
dβ = −E(a)V3, cf. Table 1. The conditions for the Hessian
to be negative semi-deﬁnite are Παα ≤ 0 and ΠααΠββ − Π2αβ ≥ 0. We assume
the last equation holds with strict inequality.
We observe from equations (11), (12) and Table 1 that the regulatory regimes
induce equal technology if and only if V ar(aσ) = V ar(aτ ) when Sσ = Sτ .
Diﬀerentiating equations (11) and (12) wrt. z ∈ {ση, σε, ρη, ρε}, i.e., increasing
V ar(a) using exogenous parameters, we get:
−kαα dα
dz
− dE(a)
dα
dα
dz
− kαβ dβ
dz
− dE(a)
dα
dβ
dz
= 0,
−kαβ dα
dz
− 1
2
dE(a2)
dα
dα
dz
−−kββ dβ
dz
− 1
2
dE(a2)
dβ
dβ
dz
=
1
2
dE(a2)
dz
.
Or, equivalently, using matrix notation and the deﬁnitions from the Hessian:
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⎛
⎜⎜⎝ Παα Παβ
Παβ Πββ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
dα
dz
dβ
dz
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ 0
1
2
dV ar(a)
dz
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ,
where we also used dE(a
2)
dz =
dV ar(a)
dz (cf. Table 1). Solving for the changes in
the technology parameters, we get:
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
dα
dz
dβ
dz
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = 1ΠααΠββ −Π2αβ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ −
1
2
dV ar(a)
dz Παβ
1
2
dV ar(a)
dz Παα
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
It then follows from the second order conditions that dαdz ≤ (≥)0 ⇔ Παβ ≥ (≤)0
and that dβdz < 0. Hence, βσ ≤ (≥)βτ if and only if V ar(aσ) ≥ (≤)V ar(aτ ).
This proves the proposition.
Derivation of equations (14) and (16): Equation (13) is equivalent with:
W = max
α,β
E
⎡
⎣∑
j∈M
(
bqj − d
2
q2j + εjqj
)
−
∑
i∈N
(
1
2
q2i + (α+ ηi)ai +
β
2
a2i + k (α, β)
)
−G(Z) +X
⎤
⎦ ,
with:
X = p(
∑
i∈N
qi −
∑
j∈M
qj) + w
∑
i∈N
(qi − qi + ai − ai) = 0.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to α and rearranging we get:
dW
dα
= E
⎡
⎣∑
j∈M
(
(b− dqj + εj − p) dqj
dα
)
+
∑
i∈N
(
(p− w − qi) dqi
dα
+ (w − α− ηi − βai)
dai
dα
− kα − ai
)⎤⎦ ,
+E
⎡
⎣
⎛
⎝∑
i∈N
qi −
∑
j∈M
qj
⎞
⎠ dp
dα
+
∑
i∈N
(ai − ai + qi − qi) dw
dα
+ w
∑
i∈N
(
dqi
dα
− dai
dα
)
−GZ dZ
dα
⎤
⎦ ,
= E
[
−
∑
i∈N
(kα + ai) + (w −GZ) dZ
dα
]
,
= −nkα − nE (ai) ,
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where we used the ﬁrst order conditions (4), (5), (6) and dZdα = 0 (cf. Table 2).
Setting dWdα = 0 and dividing by n yields equations (14) and (16).
Derivation of equations (15) and (17): Following the steps from the
derivation of equations (14) and (16) above, but diﬀerentiating with respect to
β, the ﬁrst order conditions become:
dW
dβ
= E
[
−
∑
i∈N
(
kβ +
1
2
(ai)
2
)
+ (w −GZ) dZ
dβ
]
= 0,
⇔ −nkβ − n
2
E
(
(ai)
2
)
+ E
[
(w −GZ) dZ
dβ
]
= 0,
⇔ −kβ = 1
2
(
var(a) + (E(a))
2
)
+ E
1
n
[
(w −GZ) dZ
dβ
]
.
Under emissions trading we have dZdβ =
dS
dβ = 0 (cf. Table 2). Insertion yields
equation (15). Under a tax we have dZdβ =
−1
β2
∑
ηi (cf. Table 2). Hence,
E
[
(τ −GZ) dZdβ
]
= E
[
(τ −GZ) −1β2
∑
ηi
]
= 1
β2
E [GZ
∑
ηi] =
1
β2
cov [GZ ,
∑
ηi].
Insertion yields equation (17).
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